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PROBATE REFORM IN WASHINGTON
ROBERT A. STEWART* AND JOHN RICHARD STEINCIPHER**
In 1960, two events occurred which illustrate current disenchant-
ment with Washington probate law and highlight the need for reforma-
tion and modernization. In that year the voters of this state overwhelm-
ingly' adopted an Initiative providing for joint tenancy, despite counsel
from the bar that "the initiative is dangerous and that if adopted...
will bring back a state of chaos and disrupt the operation of our modern
and progressive community property laws."2 The concern from which
this legislation issued was indicated in the Initiative's opening clause,
"[J] oint tenancy with right of survivorship permits property to pass to
the survivor without the cost or delay of probate proceedings...."
The Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar Association,
responding to its obligation to eliminate the confusion, doubt, and mis-
trust in matters of probate, referred to the Committee on Real Prop-
erty, Probate and Trusts the major task of reviewing the entire probate
.code' and of recommending necessary and desirable revisions. After
four years, the work of the Committee is expressed in a Revised Draft
of RCW Title 11, which has been approved by the Board of Governors
for submission to the 1965 legislature. In preparing this draft the Com-
mittee sought to preserve the framework and structure of the present
* Member, Washington State Bar Association.
** Instructor, University of Washington School of Law. Copyright @ 1964, Washing-
ton State Bar Association. All Rights Reserved.
1 The vote was: For-647,529; Against--430,698. WASH. SEC TARY OF STATE
OrriciL ABsTRACT oF VoTEs, STATE GENRA. ELEcT N 7 (1960).
2 Report of the President to the Washington State Bar Association, 35 WASH. L.
Ray. 492, 495 (1960).
3 RCW Title 11 includes matters of guardianship and trusts as well as probate.
Since 1961 the chairman of the Probate Committee has been Mr. George T. Shields of
the Spokane Bar. Preliminary work upon the current revision was undertaken by the
late Professor J. Gordon Gose, and the preliminary draft of the new code was prepared
by the State Code Revisor, Richard 0. White, and his assistant, E. Lee Collins. Prep-
aration of the revised draft, now being put in bill form, was done by John Richard
Steincipher, co-author of this article, acting as Staff Assistant to the Committee.
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Probate Code. In this respect the Model Probate Code constituted a
valuable research and reference source.4
The objectives sought by the Committee in drafting the recom-
mended alterations coincide with the lay and professional criticism of
the current code. The draft represents an attempt to reduce the cost of
administering decedents' and incompetents' estates and the time re-
quired for such administration, as well as the liberalization of the ad-
ministration of small estates and the alleviation of surprise results in
cases of intestacy. Underlying this was the desire to simplify pro-
cedures and eliminate unnecessary steps and requirements, along with
archaic provisions of the current code, and to clarify areas of doubt and
confusion.
What has resulted is a major overhaul of the Washington Probate
Code which deserves careful scrutiny and considered analysis. The
following is a discussion of the most important alterations and innova-
tions, in terms of the changes recommended by the Committee and the
need for and effect of such change.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
The Probate Committee has recommended a provision' based on the
Model Probate Code which effects significant changes in the law of
4 The Model Probate Code was promulgated in 1946 by the Section of Real Prop-
erty, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association in cooperation with the
University of Michigan Law School; it is now out of print and in the process of
revision.
5 Provisions which are new to the Probate Code have been denominated "New
Section," in the Revised Draft of RCW title 11. We are here concerned with New
Section 11.04.015, which provides that, "The net estate of a person dying intestate
shall descend subject to the provisions of RCW 11.04.250 and be distributed as fol-
lows: (1) Share of surviving spouse. The surviving spouse shall receive the follow-
ing share: (a) All of the net community estate; and (b) One-half of the net separate
estate if the intestate is survived by issue; or (c) Three-quarters of the net separate
estate if there is no surviving issue, but the intestate is survived by one or more of his
parents, or by one or more of the issue of one or more of his parents; or (d) All of
the net separate estate, if there is no surviving issue nor parent nor issue of parent.
(2) Shares of others than surviving spouse. The share of the net estate not distribut-
able to the surviving spouse, or the entire net estate if there is no surviving spouse,
shall descend and be distributed as follows: (a) To the issue of the intestate; if they
are all in the same degree of kinship to the intestate, they shall take equally, or if of
unequal degree, then those of more remote degrees shall take by representation. (b)
If the intestate not be survived by issue, then to the parent or parents who survive the
intestate. (c) If the intestate not be survived by issue nor by either parent, then to
those issue of the parent or parents who survive the intestate; if they are all in the
same degree of kinship to the intestate, they shall take equally, or, if of unequal degree,
then those of more remote degree shall take by representation. (d) If the intestate
not be survived by issue nor by either parent, nor by any issue of the parent or parents
who survive the intestate, then to the grandparent or grandparents who survive the
intestate, the maternal grandparent or grandparents sharing equally with the paternal
grandparent or grandparents."
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intestate succession.6 While the distinctive characteristic of this pro-
vision is the elimination of a separate method for distributing real and
personal property, more importantly, a very substantial share of the
estate is given to the surviving spouse. For example, (1) (a) of this
new section (11.04.015) stipulates that, on the death of one spouse, his
share of the community estate passes to the surviving spouse rather
than to his issue as in the present code.' In the majority of small
estates where there is a will, this is the means of disposition which the
testator desires. Yet the current code fails to recognize this and works
a "surprise" when, upon death intestate, half of the community prop-
erty falls to the issue. This creates a particularly aggravated problem
where such children are minors and where a guardianship is required.
True, there may be instances when the current distribution is pre-
ferred; for example, where the folly, personality or prejudices of the
surviving spouse deprive the issue of ever sharing in the community
estate. However, it is this possibility which most often initiates resort
to counsel and the making of a will, not the assumption that the surviv-
ing spouse will fall heir to all of the community property. Thus, the
suggested provision eliminates the "surprise" and achieves, even on
intestacy, the same results as a "joint tenancy" or community property
agreement without the serious legal complications or deficiencies which
are peculiar to these non-testamentary devices.'
In addition to receiving all of the "net community estate,"' the sur-
viving spouse will now take one-half of the net separate estate if the
intestate is survived by issue, or three quarters of such estate if there
be no surviving issue but the intestate is survived by one or more of his
parents or by one or more of the issue of one or more of his parents.1 0
The share of the net separate estate not distributable to the surviving
6 This section provides for the descent and distribution of the "net estate" (defined
as the real and personal property of a decedent exclusive of homestead rights, exempt
property, the family allowance, and enforceable claims against, and debts of, the estate)
of a person dying intestate, and replaces RCW 11.04.020, relating to the descent of
separate real property, RCW 11.04.030, relating to the descent of separate personal
property, and RCW 11.04.050, relating to descent of community property.
7 RCW 11.04.050.8 It can be argued that this proposal would work a hardship in a case where one
spouse dies a few days before a divorce is granted and the surviving spouse takes all
of the community property to the exclusion of the minor children of a prior marriage.
Again, such a case only points up the desirability of a will when things such as divorce
are contemplated.
9 "Net community estate" refers to community property defined in RCW 26.16.030,
subject to community debts and the decedent's separate debts to the extent of his one
half interest therein.
10 The reference to "one or more" parents allows for both natural and adoptive
parents, and for both father and mother.
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spouse or the entire net estate if there be no surviving spouse descends
first to the issue of the intestate, or, if the intestate is not survived by
issue, then to the parent or parents who survive the intestate." If the
intestate is not survived by issue or by either parent, then such share,
or the entire net estate, goes to those issue of the parent or parents who
survive the intestate. For want of any of these persons, and as a last
category of takers short of having the property escheat to the state, the
grandparent or grandparents who survive the intestate are nominated.
Although the latter situation is not provided for in the existing statute,
such a provision is believed to coincide with the intestate's natural ties
of affection and to be within accepted ideas of responsibility for sup-
port. The inclusion of grandparents as "heirs" is of particular advan-
tage where the intestate is a minor child whose only relatives are his
grandparents.
Descent, either to issue of the intestate, or to issue of the parent or
parents who survive the intestate, is, by the suggested definition of de-
gree of kinship, 2 per stirpes s only if the claimants are in unequal
degrees. In such a case the stirpes are those represented by the claim-
ants in the nearest degree to the intestate. The exclusion of some blood
ancestors brought about by the descent and distribution provisions
(chapter 11.04), along with the definitions of representation 4 and de-
gree of kinship in chapter 11.02, is not new to the Probate Code and is
believed to accord with the wishes of the average decedent who dies
intestate. The assumption underlying this exclusion is that some rela-
"When there is a surviving spouse, but no surviving issue, such parents would
take the remaining one-fourth of the net separate estate.
12 Degree of kinship has been defined as "the degree of kinship as computed ac-
cording to the rules of the civil law; that is, by counting upward from the intestate
to the nearest common ancestor and then downward to the relative, the degree of
kinship being the sum of these two counts." New Section 11.02.005(5).
18 Per stirpes "denotes that method of dividing an intestate estate where a class or
group of distributees take the share which their deceased would have been entitled to,
taking thus by their right of representing such ancestor, and not as so many individ-
uals." BLAcK, LAw DIcTioNARY 1294 (4th ed. 1951).
1 Representation is defined as "a method of determining distribution in which the
takers are in unequal degrees of kinship with respect to the intestate, and is accom-
plished as follows: After first determining who, of those entitled to share in the
estate, are in the nearest degree of kinship, the estate is divided into equal shares, the
number of shares being the sum of the number of persons who survive the intestate
who are in the nearest degree of kinship and the number of persons in the same degree
of kinship who died before the intestate, but who left issue surviving the intestate;
each share of a deceased person in the nearest degree shall be divided among those of
his issue who survive the intestate and have no ancestor then living who is in the line
of relationship between them and the intestate, those more remote in degree taking
together the share which their ancestor would have taken had he survived the intestate.
Posthumous children are considered as living at the death of their parent." New
Section 11.02.005(3).
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tives might be so distant that the decedent might well prefer that his
property go to the state rather than to such relatives. 5
Inheritance by Adopted Children. Having defined those ascend-
ants, descendants and collaterals who are entitled to a share of the
intestate's estate, the proposed code denotes such persons, including
the surviving spouse, as "heirs."' 6 However, one important develop-
ment is the qualification that "A lawfully adopted child shall not be
considered an heir of his natural parents for purposes of this title."'"
This provision nullifies the inclusion of "all lawfully adopted children"
in the proposed definition of "issue," 8 for purposes of intestate succes-
sion. However, it does not affect the stipulation of RCW 26.32.140
that an adopted child is the legal heir and lawful issue of his adoptive
parents, entitled to the right of inheritance and the right to take under
testamentary disposition. Thus, though the adopted child may inherit
from his adopters (a right which, when once acquired, cannot be lost
by his adoptive parent's intent to disinherit him unless expressed in
a properly executed will)"9 the right of inheritance from his natural par-
ents is lost."0 Although this proposed amendment will seriously hamper
adoption (between adults, one of the other) as a device to reduce in-
heritance tax liability, it recognizes the expectations of the natural
mother of an illegitimate placed for adoption.
Inheritance by Illegitimates. The inheritance rights of an illegit-
imate child, who has not been adopted, have been significantly extended
by the Probate Committee." In line with the repudiation in nearly
1 MODE PROBATE CODE § 22, comment (Simes 1946).
X6 New Section 11.02.005(6).
1 "New Section 11.04.085.
isIssue "includes all the lawful lineal descendants of the ancestor, all lawfully
adopted children, and illegitimates as specified in [New Section] RCW 11.04.081."
New Section 11.02.005 (4).
'9 West v. Stanfield, 48 Wn2d 55, 290 P.2d 704 (1955).
20 The case of In re Roderick's Estate, 158 Wash. 377, 291 Pac. 325 (1930), de-
clared that an adopted child is, in a legal sense, a child of both his natural and his
adoptive parents, and, in the absence of statutes to the contrary, is entitled to inherit
from both. The Committee recommends such a statute to the contrary.
21 New Section 11.04.081 replaces RCW 11.04.080 and 11.04.090 and provides: "For
purpose of inheritance to, through and from an illegitimate child, such child shall be
treated the same as if he were the legitimate child of his mother, so that he and his
issue shall inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred, in all degrees, and
they may inherit from him. Such child shall also be treated the same as if he were a
legitimate child of his mother for the purpose of determining homestead rights, the
distribution of exempt property and the making of family allowances. When the
parents of an illegitimate child shall marry subsequent to his birth, or the father shall
acknowledge said child in writing, such child shall be deemed to have been made the
legitimate child of both of the parents for purposes of intestate succession."
19651
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every state of the notion that an illegitimate child is "nullius filius" and
incapable of inheriting and transmitting any estate, an illegitimate child
and his issue may, under the proposed Code, inherit from his mother
and from his maternal kindred in all degrees, and they may inherit from
him. This proposal departs from the current treatment of illegitimates
in that, heretofore," an illegitimate child could not claim as represent-
ing his mother any part of the estate of her kindred unless his parents
had intermarried and his father had, in writing signed in the presence
of a competent witness, acknowledged him as his child.2" Further, de-
parting from existing provisions, the Probate Committee has expressly
recognized an illegitimate child's rights with respect to a homestead,
the distribution of exempt property, and the award of family allow-
ances, to the extent that they may be claimed by virtue of legitimacy
with respect to his natural mother.
Elimination of the Doctrine of Ancestral Property. Under the ex-
press provisions of the existing code,24 property which came to an inte-
state by descent, devise, or gift from one of his ancestors,25 could not
be inherited by those who were not of the blood of such ancestor. 6
With the adoption of the descent and distribution provisions recom-
mended by the Committee," declaring inter alia that kindred of the half
blood inherit the same share which they would have inherited if they
had been of the whole blood, 8 the "anachronistic doctrine" of ancestral
property will have been repudiated. Although one may visualize in-
stances where preservation of the blood-line integrity of property is
22 RCW 11.04.080.
2 3 Under the suggested provision, the father need only acknowledge such child in
writing; no witnesses are required.
24 RCW 11.04.100.
25 This includes kindred of such ancestor's blood.
26 As interpreted by the court in It re Kurtzman's Estate, 65 Wash. Dec. 2d 242,
396 P.2d 786 (1964), the phrase in RCW 11.04.100 that "unless the inheritance comes
to the intestate by descent, devise, or gift from on of his ancestors, or kindred of such
ancestor's blood, in which case all those who are not of the blood of such ancestors
shall be excluded from such inheritance," only limits the right to inherit by those of
the half blood, and does not establish a preference in favor of kindred of ancestors
devolving property upon decedents. The Committee's proposal will eliminate both the
common law "half-blood" and "ancestral property" restrictions, as well as the mixture
of these announced in In re Kurtzman's Estate.
27 New Sections 11.04.015 and 11.04.035.
28 New Section 11.04.035 provides that "Kindred of the half blood shall inherit the
same share which they would have inherited if they had been of the whole blood."
The term "whole blood" means the relationship of children who have both parents in
common, and "half-blood" designates the relationship between children who have at
least one of their parents in common. This section, by putting both whole and half
bloods on a par, repudiates the common law rule that property may not pass to those
related by the half blood.
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desirable (as where it might fall out of the family to a non-related sur-
viving spouse), such considerations are believed to be outweighed by
the resultant complications to the descent of property. Also of moment
here is the desire to effectuate the assumed wish of the intestate-as
opposed to that of collateral relatives.
Abolition of Tenancy by the Entireties. Title 11 currently con-
tains a memorial section entitled "Survivorship Between Joint Ten-
ants Abolished-Exceptions." In 1961, with the passage of what is now
RCW chapter 64.28, establishing joint tenancies with right of survivor-
ship, this section was repealed and such repealer is presumed to have
resurrected the property device of tenancy by the entireties as it existed
at common law. Historically, tenancy by the entireties was allowed
only between a husband and wife and was created by a conveyance to
them, whereupon each became seized and possessed of the entire estate
with right of survivorship. The characteristic which distinguished this
property device from joint tenancy was the fact that it could be ter-
minated only by joint action of the husband and wife during their lives.
As Professor Atkinson notes,8" the arguments for the abolition of this
device arise from the uncertainty as to what language will create the
estate, the indestructibility of the estate without mutual consent in the
event of matrimonial discord, and the fact that property so held is
generally subject to the debts of the deceased tenant. Further, in
Washington, RCW 83.04.020 excludes real property held by the entire-
ties from the decedent's gross estate for purposes of inheritance taxa-
tion; such exclusion is deemed neither justifiable nor desirious.
Considering these objections, and believing that this device has been
superseded by our system of community property, the Probate Com-
mittee has recommended its express abolition.
To the extent that the resurrection of such tenancies has created
vested rights, these are saved by the proposed "savings clause" which
applies to all of title 11.81 This clause is recommended in part because
of the difficulty of anticipating "accrued or vested" rights protected by
29 RCW 11.04.070.30 ATKINSON, WILLS 165 (2d ed. 1953).
81 The proposed "savings clause!' was adopted from section 2(b) of the Model
Probate Code and provides that, "No act done in any proceeding commenced before
this title takes effect and no accured right shall be impaired by its provision. When
a right is acquired, extinguished or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period
of time which has commenced to run by the provisions of any statute in force before
this title takes effect, such provisions shall remain in force and be deemed a part of
this code with respect to such right."
1965]
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due process of law, 2 and also because the Probate Committee enter-
tained no intent of depriving persons of their lawfully acquired rights."
Elimination of a Separate Method for the Descent of Real and
Separate Property-Liability for Debts. The distinctive character-
istic of the scheme proposed for descent and distribution34 is the elim-
ination of a separate method for distributing real and personal prop-
erty. While this suggestion does not alter the existing order of liability
of property for the debts of the estate, the Committee has expressly
abrogated the interpretation that RCW 11.56.020 requires personal
assets to be first applied to the payment of the decedent's debts, and
that only when such personalty was exhausted could realty be em-
ployed."3 A new section 6 has been recommended which stipulates that
there is to be no priority between real and personal property in determ-
ining what property of the estate should be sold, leased, or mortgaged
under RCW 11.56. Thus the order of liability has been placed in the
court's discretion, subject to the dictates of RCW 26.16-establishing
the community property system in Washington, and basing the order
of liability upon the nature of the debt as opposed to the real or per-
sonal character of the property. Therefore, as announced in In re
Schoenfeld's Estate,3  all of the community property is subject to
administration for the purpose of collecting assets and paying com-
munity debts, although the community property is liable only for com-
munity obligations and separate debts to the extent of the decedent's
one-half interest therein. No change is made by the Committee's rec-
ommendation that all of the net community estate descends to the sur-
viving spouse."3 The community property is primarily liable for com-
munity debts, while separate property is primarily liable for separate
debts, and a creditor must exhaust his remedy against the appropriate
82 In Hamilton v. Hersch, 2 Wash. Terr. 22, 5 Pac. 215 (1884), the court held
that dower and curtesy were not vested property rights, but were only inchoate rights
which could be abolished (RCW 11.04.060) without a violation of due process.
33 The proposed "savings clause" is also applicable where limitations periods have
been altered, i.e., RCW 11.40.010, where the time for filing creditors' claims has been
reduced from six to four months, and the extension of the six year limitation period
imposed by RCW 11.04.270 to all of the property of the estate, as opposed to only
realty.
34 New Section 11.04.015. See note 6 supra.
35 See In re Binge's Estate, 5 Wn.2d 446, 105 P.2d 689 (1940).
36 New Section 11.56.015 provides that "In determining what property of the
estate shall be sold, mortgaged or leased for any purpose provided by RCW 11.56.020
and 11.56.030 [as amended], there shall be no priority as between real and personal
property, except as provided by will, if any."
37 56 Wn.2d 197, 351 P.2d 935 (1960).
38 New Section 11.04.015(1) (a).
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primary fund before he can resort to the secondary fund. The decedent
could, of course, provide by will that all of the debts of the estate, in-
cluding community obligations, are to be paid out of his share of the
community property and such a direction will be honored so long as
his estate is adequate to pay those debts.
WrLS
The right to dispose of one's property by will, which the Washington
court has declared a valuable property right assured by law, 9 is pres-
ently codified in RCW 11.12.010 and has not been altered in the Pro-
bate Committee's revision. However, the definition of "will" 40 as in-
cluding all codicils "attached to any will," has been deleted, and "wil"
is now defined as including all codicils.41 A codicil is expressly said to
mean "an instrument executed in the manner provided.., for wills,
which refers to an existing will for the purpose of altering or changing
the same, and which need not be attached thereto." The inclusion of
this definition was prompted by the court's interpretation of the phrase
"attached to any will" as requiring actual physical attachment.42 The
proposed definition of codicil conforms to that set forth in In re Whit-
tier's Estate' 3 (a codicil traditionally being held to the formalities of
a will in its execution), and is designed to eliminate the necessity of
actual physical attachment. What is now required is internal reference
to an existing will. Although a codicil lacking the necessary internal
reference would not be admitted to probate, the "surprise" resulting
from want of successful annexation has been eliminated. Further, the
process of construing the will and its codicils together for the purpose
of gathering the general intention pervading both" has been facilitated.
Nun-Cupative Wills. The formalities by which one exercises the
right to make a will are presently set forth in RCW 11.12.020, and no
substantive change has been recommended. However, the provision
relating to nuncupative wills has been repositioned 5 for purposes of
clarity, and the amount of wages or personal property which may be so
bequeathed has been increased from two hundred to one thousand dol-
39 In re Schafer's Estate, 8 Wn2d 517, 113 P.2d 41 (1941).10 RCW 11.12.240.
41 New Section 11.02.005(8) and (9).
42 See In re Whittier's Estate, 26 Wn2d 833, 176 P2d 281 (1947), and State ex rel.
Schrimer v. Superior Court, 143 Wash. 578, 255 Pac. 960 (1927).
43 26 Wn.2d 833, 176 P.2d 281 (1947).
-4 Hunt v. Hunt, 18 Wash. 14, 50 Pac. 578 (1897).
45 New Section 11.12.025.
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lars. This but reflects an attempt to make the allowance of specific
dollar amounts more realistic throughout title 11,1' and does not evi-
dence dissatisfaction with the court's pronouncement that nuncupative
wills are disfavored in law because of the opportunities for fraud and
perjury attending the probate of such wills."
Revocation of Will by Subsequent Marriage. Under the current
code,48 unless provision is made for the surviving spouse by marriage
settlement or unless such surviving spouse is provided for in the last
will or mentioned therein such as to indicate an intention not to provide
for such spouse, a will executed prior to marriage is deemed revoked.
Although no disagreement is taken with the policy manifested by this
provision, it seems extreme to require complete frustration of the testa-
tor's intent where this is not necessary. To rectify this, the Committee
suggests that the will be revoked only as to the surviving spouse.4
Through this change the spouse will take the complete share which
would have been taken upon death intestate, yet the testator's inten-
tion will be observed with respect to the remainder of his estate.
Proof of Wills. Although experience indicates that our current
procedure for initiating the probate of an estate is generally quite effi-
cient and simple, a problem does arise in obtaining the testimony
needed to prove a will. It is currently required" that witnesses appear
and testify in person unless prevented by sickness from attending, or
unless they reside out of state, or more than thirty miles from the place
where the will is to be proven. If a witness is ill or resides more than
thirty miles away, then a commission must be issued to a judge, justice
of the peace, or notary public (the latter being most often used) direct-
ing him to take and certify the testimony of the witness and to then
return the commission and deposition directly to the court. While this
procedure is elaborate, it relies, in the final analysis, entirely upon the
46 See also RCW 11.76.090 where the committee recommends an increase in the
amount distributable to a minor, without the necessity of a bond or the appointment
of a guardian, from one hundred to five hundred dollars.
47 Brown v. State, 87 Wash. 44, 151 Pac. 81 (1915).
48 RCW 11.12.050.
49 RCW 11.12.050 would thus be amended to read: "If, after making any will, the
testator shall marry and the spouse shall be living at the time of the death of the
testator, such will shall be deemed revoked as to such spouse, unless provision shall
have been made for such survivor by marriage settlement, or unless such survivor be
provided for in the will or in such way mentioned therein as to show an intention not
to make such provision, and no other evidence to rebut the presumpton of revocation
shall be received. A divorce, subsequent to the making of a will, shall revoke the
will as to the divorced spouse."
50 RCW 11.20.030.
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integrity of the notary and is no more immune from the possibilities of
fraud than the practice of using a simple affidavit with a photographic
copy of the will attached-the method now used in California.51 The
use of such an affidavit alleviates the severe hardship which the oral
testimony requirement works upon the witness of advanced years and
the witness who is unable to leave his business or place of employment.
No recommendation is made with regard to this device in the current
proposal.
The Committee has recommended the deletion of the existing pro-
vision concerning the proof required where one or more witnesses are
unable or incompetent to testify. 2 In its place, a much simplified clause
is proposed which retains the intent of the former section. It is now
specified 3 that the subsequent incompetency for whatever cause, of
one or more of the subscribing witnesses, or, the inability to testify in
open court or pursuant to commission, shall not prevent the probate
of a will. By this the Committee has not meant to authorize a "self-
proving" will, but has provided that the competency of such witness
must be proven, and the handwriting of the testator and at least one
absent subscribing witness must be established. Further, by authoriz-
ing the court to consider such other facts and circumstances as would
tend to prove the will, a wider discretion is permitted the court than
under the present code, and the necessity of obtaining a special court
order is dispensed with.
PROBATE NOTICES
No comprehensive effort to modernize the Probate Code could be
accomplished without consideration of its impractical, archaic notice
provisions. Not only is such a review called for by the desire to elim-
inate the layman's "make-work" criticism but also by the ramifications
of procedural due process noted by the Supreme Court in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.5 Mullane indicates that publica-
"1 CAL. PROBATE CODE § 329 provides that in the absence of a contest the court may
admit the will to probate on the evidence of one subscribing witness only, either by
testimony in court, deposition or affidavit, in which latter case a photographic copy
of the will must be attached.
52 RCW 11.20.040.
53 See the proposed amendatory clause to RCW 11.20.040.
54 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Until this decision, it was generally held that decrees of
distribution based on posted or published notice were valid. Mullane in substance
held that published notice under a New York statute concerning administration of
trust estates might not be adequate if the person giving the notice knew the where-
abouts of the interested parties and failed to give them direct notice of some sort.
This decision prompted the Washington Supreme Court to adopt RPPP 98.04W
requiring, inter alia, the mailing of notice of appointment and pendency of probate
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tion at best is a dubious method of giving notice. Our present system
seems wholly inadequate in this respect insofar as it sanctions the pub-
lication in many newspapers scattered throughout a given county of
lengthy, obscure notices which are difficult to read and understand.
Official Probate Newspaper. To rectify the existing situation, a
new chapter was recommended by the Committee,55 calling for the
annual award by the county commissioners of a single contract to a
"legal" newspaper to function as the official probate newspaper in that
particular county. All notices in connection with the administration
of a decedent's estate were to be published by line item in that paper.
The obvious advantage, in terms of "due process" and the requirement
that notice be given which is reasonably calculated to reach those
affected, is at once apparent. Under such a system, any creditor, heir or
beneficiary could, with certainty, look to one particular publication for
information concerning all decedent's estates without the necessity for
searching through half a dozen or more publications. Further, the crea-
tion of this notice device would eliminate innumerable duplications of
language and reduce printing space, while saving the publication ex-
penses now incurred. It must be emphasized that the foremost con-
sideration in this proposal is simply that due process is not satisfied by
the current, authorized burial of such notices, and that to sustain the
ignorance of interested parties in an attempt, perhaps, to aid marginal
publications is without justification. Unfortunately, the sponsors"s
expressed a different opinion, and this proposal is not included in the
bill to be presented the legislature. Thus, due to political expediency,
revision of notice provisions is confined to establshing consistency in
language, i.e., "a legal newspaper" has been substituted for "some
newspaper."
INVENTORY OF ASSETS-APPRASEMENT
The purpose of the inventory, along with its appraisement, is to
make a record of the property belonging to the estate, to indicate its
presumptive value, and to furnish a basis upon which the personal
representative makes his accounts and for which he is chargeable." To
within twenty days after the appointment of a personal representative. Later, this
rule was codified in RCW 11.76.040.
5 RCW 11.18.
56 By one vote, the proposal regarding the "official probate newspaper" failed to
pass the Legislative Committee of the Washington State Bar Association; the Board
of Governors accepted the Legislative Committee's judgment.
57 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 120, comment (Simes 1946).
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better effectuate this purpose, the Probate Committee has rec-
ommended several alterations. Under the plan proposed by the Com-
mittee, the personal representative is to make and return upon oath, 8
within three months of his appointment,59 a true inventory of the prop-
erty which has come in to his possession or knowledge."0 This departs
from existing RCW 11.44.010 insofar as that section required the filing
of the inventory within one month from appointment. Further, provi-
sion is now made"' for the extension of the filing time where that is
exigent due to the nature of the estate.
In facilitating the use of the inventory as indicative of the nature
and extent of the property, all encumbrances, liens, or other secured
charges against any particular item must now be listed. While a few
states have provided for the listing of claims against the estate in the
inventory, the Committee has provided only for the listing of the
charges noted. Although a more inclusive enumeration would seem to
better index the net worth of the estate, ordinarily this amounts to no
more than conjecture on the part of the personal representative.
In the proposed scheme, a classification of property is specified,
arranged in a sequence similar to that of the schedules used in a federal
estate tax return.62
An additional suggestion worthy of consideration has been made,
although not recommended by the Probate Committee. That is the
inclusion in the inventory of a statement of community assets. Such a
specification would greatly aid in creating a valuable notice-giving
document. Indeed, the authors of the Model Probate Code suggest
that property held jointly or by the entirety be separately stated due
to the tendency of some jurisdictions to subject such property to in-
heritance taxes.68
In view of the special nature of partnership property and of its
primary liability for the payment of partnership debts, no inventory of
such property is required of the personal representative. (This inven-
58 New Section 11.44.015 provides for the return of the inventory "upon oath," and
continues this portion of existing RCW 11.44.010.
GONew Section 11.44.015.6
°While the Probate Committee has retained RCW 11.44.010's direction that the
inventory include all property which has come into the personal representative's
possession, it added the inclusion of such property as has come to his knowledge.
New Section 11.44.015.62.Existing RCW 11.44.010 made no provision for extending the time of filing the
inventory; the Probate Committee recognizes that this may be required in particularly
troublesome estates, and specific authorization is given in New Section 11.44.015.
62 Specifically, Form 706.
6 3 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 120, comment (Simes 1946).
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tory is to be filed within thirty days of the partner's death by the
surviving partners. 4) However, the Committee has recommended65
that the personal representative's inventory identify the decedent's
proportionate share in any partnership.66
Appraisal. Although the changes noted promise substantial benefit,
the most significant reform has come with respect to procedures for
appraisal. Corresponding to the classification of assets now proposed,
a new section" is recommended which directs the appraisers to deter-
mine and state in figures opposite each item contained in the inventory,
the fair net value thereof after deducting the encumbrances, liens, and
other secured charges. The inventory and appraisement are then
consolidated into one document which is to be filed within thirty days
following the date of the appraisers appointment, unless extended by
the court.
The Committee has recommended the deletion of the current sec-
tion68 providing that the personal representative is to make application
to the court for the appointment of three disinterested persons as
appraisers within thirty days after the filing of the inventory of the
property of the estate. The proposed replacement merely specifies that
application is to be made by the personal representative for the ap-
pointment of three suitable disinterested persons to appraise the prop-
erty inventoried. No time is set for making this application; however,
a "reasonable time" is established by implication since the inventory
is to be filed within three months from the date of the personal rep-
resentative's appointment."6 Although an existing code section"' refers
to the compensation of the appraiser nominated by the Supervisor of
the State Tax Commission, there is no specific recognition in RCW
title 11 of the supervisor's right" to so nominate one appraiser. The
64 RCW 11.64.002.
65 New Section 11.44.015(6) provides that the inventory is also to include "All
other personal property accurately identified, including the decedent's proportionate
share in any partnership, but no inventory of the partnership property shall be re-
quired of the personal representative."6 6 The Committee has also recommended retention of RCW 11.64.040, which
authorizes the personal representative to agree with the surviving partner for con-
tinuation of the partnership business. Such agreement is subject to court approval.
67 New Section 11.44.065 replaces existing RCW 11.44.020.
68 RCW 11.44.010.
69 New Section 11.44.055. The last paragraph of this recommended section pro-
vides, "If any part of the estate shall be in a county other than that in which the
letters are issued, appraisers residing in that county may be appointed, or the same
appraisers may act." The clause was taken from existing RCW 11.44.010.
70 New Section 11.44.015.
71 RCW 11.44.010.
72 RCW 83.16.040.
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Committee recommends the express recognition of this right in the
probate code, as well as providing for its waiver." By custom the
second appraiser is nominated by the personal representative and the
third is nominated by the court.74 Although the Committee has sug-
gested no method to curtail the use of the power of nomination for
political purposes by both governors and judges-a fact of life, some-
times resulting in the appointment of persons having no particular
competencyt 5-- it is suggested that the fees of the three appraisers
hereafter be computed on the basis of assets actually appraised. Thus
a new section- - -8 provides that the valuation of moneys, drafts, bank
and saving and loan association acounts, checks and bonds, or securi-
ties listed with a recognized securities market or exchange is not to be
included in computing any appraiser's fee. This limitation is meant to
apply to the set percentage specified for the supervisor's nominee,"7 as
well as to any percentage which the court might employ in determining
the "reasonable" compensation to be allowed the other appraisers.
Only the nominee of the Inheritance Tax Supervisor must be paid a
fee of one-tenth of one percent of the appraised value" of the assets.
But, despite the prohibition announced in In re Crutaler's Estate't
against the substitution of this measure for the discretion of the court
with respect to compensation of the other appraisers, in practice, all
three are paid this amount. Nevertheless, with the exclusion of those
items requiring no appreciable effort in determining value, unnecessary
expenses have been curtailed and the value of such patronage dimin-
ished. Also to these ends is the suggestion that the rule under which
appraisement may be dispensed with be liberalized. As proposed by
by the Committee, 0 where the inventory or other proof, demonstrates
73 New Section 11.44.055 provides in part, "The personal representatives shall
apply to the court for the appointment of three suitable disinterested persons to
appraise the property inventoried, one of whom shall be the nominee of the supervisor
of the inheritance tax division of the tax commission of the state of Washington,
unless said supervisor waives his right to nominate an appraiser, and the court shallappoint such appraisers."
apitscapries74 Te ractice of appointing the nominee of the personal representative as the
second appraiser is not required by existing statute.
75A much better system prevails in California (CAT. PROBATE CODE § 605) where
the court appoints only one appraiser from a list of qualified inheritance tax ap-
praisers, and the single fee paid to him is less than the fee paid to each one in
Washington. CAL. PROBATE CODE § 609 provides that the appraiser's fee shall be one-
tenth of one percent of the first $500,000 and one-twentieth of one percent above that
amount
76 New Section 11.44.070.
7 Ibid.
78 RCW 11.44.010.
79 31 Wn.2d 16, 194 P.2d 964 (1948).
80 New Section 11.44.080.
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that the whole estate consists of personal property of less value than
one thousand dollars"' the court may accept the verified appraisal of
the personal representative in lieu of an appraisal by appraisers.
In assessing the alterations proposed with respect to appraisal, it
must be remembered that any reform assaults an entrenched political
plum. Undoubtedly, in suggesting even this minimal revision (there
are those who would abolish the existing system altogether) the Com-
mittee has taken on a formidable foe; an adversay who will plead its
case in committee as opposed to the floor of either house. Yet, in dis-
charging its responsibility to the public and the Bar, this was a risk of
defeat which the Committee had to take. Hopefully, it will be appre-
ciated.
ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENT'S ESTATES
A number of changes have been recommended by the Probate Com-
mittee to provide flexibility in the administration of decedent's estates
and to reflect both modern business practice and practical necessity.
Among the foremost of these is the alteration suggested in the pro-
cedure governing the sale of real estate. 2
Sale by Negotiation. In addition to sale by public auction, the
existing code authorizes the private sale of real estate. However, all
too often the publication of notice calling for bids on the property 3
occurs only after an earnest money receipt and agreement has been
signed.84 If an upset bid85 is then received, the effort of the real estate
broker who obtained the initial purchaser may have been in vain.
Since one effect of this procedure is to discourage efforts to find buyers,
the result is the frustration of the purpose of the statutory procedure
governing a sale by competitive bids. Both the artificiality of the
existing provisions and the exigencies of prevalent practice have
prompted the inclusion of specific authorization of sale by negotiation."
While some liberalization is thus effected, sale by negotiation will not
8 1 This amount is stated to be "exclusive of moneys, drafts, bank and savings and
loan association accounts, checks, and bonds or securities listed with a recognized
securities market or exchange....
82 Authority to sell real estate is granted broadly in RCW 11.56.010, and partic-
ularly in RCW 11.56.030.
83 RCW 11.56.080.
84 The earnest money receipt and agreement should, of course, be conditioned on
obtaining the approval of the sale by the superior court.
85 RCW 11.56.110.
s6 This has been accomplished by inserting, in RCW 11.56.020 relating to personal-
ty, and in RCW 11.56.050 relating to realty, specific authorization for "sale by
negotiation."
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jeopardize the interests of the heirs or the rights of creditors of the
estate, since such sales are subject to order 7 and approval8 of the
court.
Closely allied with the specific sanction of sale by negotiation is the
recommendation 9 authorizing the personal representative, without
advance court approval, to pay the customary and reasonable auc-
tioneer's and broker's fees and any necessary expenses for abstracting,
title insurance, survey, revenue stamps, and other necessary costs and
expenses incurred, out of the proceeds realized.
Power to Lease, Exchange and Borrow. In addition to the tradi-
tional sale and mortgage of property, the ability of the personal
representative to meet cash requirements has been expanded by au-
thorization of the lease 0 and exchange of property," both real and
personal. The purpose of these provisions is to permit the effective
management of assets through additional flexibility, while the rights of
interested persons are safeguarded by subjecting the exercise of such
authority to the direction and control of the court. In the same vein,
the Committee has recommended a provision 2 allowing the personal
representative to borrow on the general credit of the estate. Insofar
as this transcends the current restriction to mortgages, the personal
representative's financial power has been significantly improved.
Performance of Decedent's Contracts. Pursuing the intent to
modernize estate administration, the recommendation is also made that
the Probate Code be expanded to allow the performance of all of the
87 RCW 11.56.050.
88 RCW 11.56.100.89 New Section 11.56.265.
DoAs amended, RCW 11.56.010 will read: "The court may order real or personal
property sold, leased or mortgaged.., but no sale, lease or mortgage of any property
of an estate shall be made except under an order of the court, unless otherwise
provided by law."91 New Section 11.56.005 provides: '"henever it shall appear upon the petition of
the personal representative or of any person interested in the estate to be to the best
interests of the estate to exchange any real or personal property of the estate for
other property, the court may authorize the exchange upon such terms and conditions
as it may prescribe, which include the payment or receipt of part cash by the personal
representative. If personal property of the estate is to be exchanged, the procedure
required by this chapter for the sale of such property shall apply so far as may be;
if real property of the estate is to be exchanged, the procedure required by this chapter
for the sale of such property shall apply so far as may be."
92 New Section 11.56.280 provides: "Whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction
of the court that money is needed to pay debts of the estate, expenses of administra-
tion, inheritance tax, or estate tax, the court may by order authorize the personal
representative to borrow such money, on the general credit of the estate, as appears to
the court necessary for the purposes aforsesaid...."
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decedent's contracts, not just those to convey real property.93 (A
similar provision is recommended with respect to guardianship es-
tates.9") This necessary and prudent extension of authority is de-
signed to increase the personal representative's effectiveness in the
management and control of the estate, subject to court authorization
and direction. Three provisions contribute to this scheme: The first
authorizes the personal representative to perform contracts of his
decedent;95 the second allows the person to whom performance was to
run to apply for a court order directing the personal representative to
perform;96 and the third authorizes the personal representative to
bring all actions upon contract which could have been maintained by
the decedent.97 These sections further reflect the intent of, and supple-
ment, existing authority to continue a decedent's going business98 al-
though the personal representative's power in this respect continues
to be prescribed by the court's order of authorization.
Non-Intervention Wills. Chapter 11.68 embodies the non-interven-
tion will provisions and establishes the statutory facility for admin-
istration without court supervision. By virtue of RCW 11.68.010,
"After the probate of any such will and the filing of the inventory all
such estates may be managed and settled without the intervention of
the court, if the last will and testament so provides." In construing this
provision, the court has emphasized that once the intention to dispense
with administration is found from the express words or necessary
implication of the will,99 the executor becomes a "trustee," deriving his
powers from the will and not from the court.' 9 Despite the interpreta-
93RCW 11.60.010, as amended, will provide: "If any person, who is bound by
contract, in writing, shall die before performing said contract, the superor court of
the county in which the estate is being administered, may upon application of the
personal representative, without notice, make an order authorizing and directing the
personal representative to perform such contract."
94 RCW 11.92.130.
95 RCW 11.60.010.
96 RCW 11.60.020, as amended, provides: "If the personal representative fails to
make such application, then any person claiming to be entitled to such performance
under such contract, may present a petition setting forth the facts upon which such
claim is predicated. Notice of hearing shall be in accordance with the provisions of
RCW 11.16.081."
9T RCW 11.48.090, as amended, provides: "Actions for the recovery of any prop-
erty or for the possession thereof, and all actions founded upon contracts, may be
maintained by and against personal representatives in all cases in which the same
might have been maintained by and against their respective testators or intestates."
98 RCW 11.48.025 provides: "Upon a showing of advantage to the estate the court
may authorize a personal representative to continue any business of the decedent,
other than the business of a partnership of which the decedent was a member:
provided .... "
99 Shufeldt v. Hughes, 55 Wash. 246, 104 Pac. 253 (1909).
100 Bayer v. Bayer, 83 Wash. 430, 145 Pac. 433 (1915).
[Voi- 39
PROBATE RFORM
tion of the right of non-intervention administration as a "vested right,"
the court has declared that one who submits the will for administration
and his official acts to the control of the court, thereby waives non-
intervention status 10 To prevent the extension of this waiver rule,
the Probate Committee recommends the addition of a provision to the
effect that "The obtaining of any interim order by the executor of a
non-intervention will shall not be deemed to be a waiver of the non-
intervention powers of such executor." 02
With one exception (see the discussion of "Probate Notice," above)
the only other alteration made in this chapter is the extension to the
non-intervention executor, of the power to borrow money on the gen-
eral credit of the estate. Although this may be criticized insofar as the
non-intervention executor acts without court supervision, and without
notice to interested parties,08 the need for modernization and flexibility
is as important here as in supervised estates. Further, non-intervention
status is achieved only by the express wish of the testator, who neces-
sarily must have faith in the judgment and prudence of his nominee,
and who may evaluate such plan in light of this grant of authority.
While the court sits in a protective capacity in the administration of
all estates, one must not minimize the testator's right to dispose of
his assets, as he wishes.
Maintenance of Adequate Court Control. While on the one hand
there is a need to simplify and modernize our probate procedure to the
end that it will cost less in time and money, there iimfst be sufficient
court control to insure that the rights of all are protected. Experience
has demonstrated that, although these may seem to be conflicting
objectives, they can be simultaneously achieved. The Probate Com-
mittee of the King County Superior Court, under the chairmanship of
Judge Eugene A. Wright, established in 1958 a program .of control
over estates for the purpose of insuring that personal representatives
are properly and expeditiously performing their duties. Basically, it
involves a systematic investigation of the condition of dormant estates
and guardianships, i.e., those which have not been closed and which
apparently are not receiving the diligent attention required by ap-
plicable statute or court rule. This review is conducted by third year
1.0111; re Clawson's Estate, 3 Wn2d 509, 101 P2d 968 (1940).
102 RCW 11.68.010, as amended.
103 It is, however, suggested that the special notice provisions of RCW 1128.240
are applicable to non-intervention executors.
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law students using a checklist prepared by the court. If defects or
omissions are found, the file is placed on a probate review calendar
and a notice is sent to the attorney of record. The results have been
excellent. The program does not hinder those estates which are being
handled properly or expeditiously, and at the same time it does im-
prove the handling of all others. Serious defalcations have been dis-
covered and protection of the rights of minor heirs, creditors and
others has been considerably improved." 4
The King County Superior Court's program is clearly authorized by
present law,1"5 but because it is not mandatory, the superior courts in
many counties do not have to exercise any supervision over estates and
as a consequence unnecessary costs and delay can result.' Although
the Probate Committee has made no specific recommendation with
regard to this matter, consideration should be given to an amendment
which would require the court in each county to conduct some type of
continuous effective review of all probate files, and to take appropriate
action to see that estates are properly and promptly administered.
In addition, the problem of neglect is compounded in non-interven-
tion estates. Once a decree of solvency has been entered, the only
opportunity the court has for ascertaining whether the administration
is expeditious and proper is on the petition of a creditor or benefi-
ciary. 7 The statute does not expressly authorize the court, on its own
'
0 4 For a comprehensive report on the King County Superior Court's program, see
Austin, Court Supervision of the Administration of Estates and Guardianships, 34
WASH. L Rv. 263 (1959). Prior to the establishment of this program it was not
uncommon for estates in King County to remain open and dormant for years. See,
e.g., Estate of Martin Bums, Probate No. 50457, Super. Ct. Wash., King County,
where the file indicates that although the administrator was appointed in 1930, and
qualified by filing his oath and bond, and although he later filed an inventory of
stocks, real estate and other assets of apparent value, he never filed a final report and
the estate has never been dosed. The last action was taken in 1935 when the surety
gave notice of its desire to be relieved of further liability. The file shows that the
decedent died intestate, leaving as his heirs five brothers and sisters scattered from
coast to coast. The matter has come to light recently as a result of efforts to locate
present owners of certain stock listed in the inventory. In addition to the cost of
re-opening the estate and tracing and reconstructing heirship, there are also clouds on
the titles to the real property listed in the invenory which may now arise.
105 RCW 11.28.250 provides, in part, that "Whenever the court has reason to
believe that any executor or administrator has ... wrongfully neglected the estate, or
has neglected to perform any acts as such executor or administrator, or for any ...
reason which to the court appears necessary, it shall have power and authority, after
citation and hearing to revoke such letters." See also RCW 11.28.160 and RCW
11.88.120. The latter section empowers the court to remove guardians for "good and
sufficient reasons."
106 The authors are familiar with an estate commenced in a county other than
King, in 1955, which is still pending. The administrator of that estate has incurred
costs and performed much of the work of an administrator without posting the bond
as directed by the court.
107 RCW 11.68.030 provides, in part: "If the person named in the will fails to
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motion, to make inquiry because such power would presumably rep-
resent a violation of the principle of our non-intervention will stat-
ute." 8 Although again not dealt with in the Probate Committee's
revision of Title 11, an amendment should be considered which would
authorize the court to cite a non-intervention executor, after the estate
has been pending for two years, to appear and show cause why the
estate has not been dosed' 9
ACCELERATION OF THE SETTLEMENT op ESTATES-SMALL ESTATES
By virtue of existing RCW 11.40.010, creditors are permitted a
period of six months within which to file their claims."' Although this
operates to the advantage of creditors in allowing substantial time to
prepare their claims and the supporting affidavits (RCW 11.40.020),
the emphasis is placed on delay as opposed to securing notice to cred-
itors since the time period begins to run with the first publication of
notice, and notice need be published but once each week for three
successive weeks. An estate, regardless of size, ordinarily cannot be
dosed prior to the expiration of this six month period. The Probate
Committee recommends the reduction of this time to four months."'
The Probate Committee also recommends the alteration of RCW
11.04.270 which provides that a decedent's "real estate" is not liable
for his debts where letters testamentary or of administration have not
been granted within six years from the date of death; the Committee
execute the trust faithfully and to take care and promote the interest of all parties,
then, upon petition of a creditor of the estate, or of any of the heirs, or of any person
on behalf of any minor heir, the court shall cite such person to appear before it,....
3o RCW 11.68.010.
10D An estate administered under a non-intervention will must be formally closed,
either by means of a final report, hearing and decree of distribution, or by means of a
declaration of completion. RCW 11.68.010 in part provides: "If no application for a
final decree is filed, the executor shall, when the administration of the estate has been
completed, file a written declaration to that effect, and thereupon his powers shall
cease." (Emphasis added.) See, in this respect, the proposed amendment to RCW
11.28.240 which will allow interested parties to request special notice of the filing of a
declaration of completion.
110 Although this section refers to "claims against the deceased," claims against
the estate (for example, funeral claims) must be filed within the time here prescribed,
by virtue of RCW 11.40.080's command that "No holder of any claim against an
estate shall maintain an action thereon, unless the claim shall have been first presented
as herein provided." See: Hennessey Funeral Home, Inc. v- Dean, 65 Wn. 2d
1000, 395 P2d 493 (1964); Butterworth v. Bredemeyer, 89 Wash. 677, 155 Pac.
152 (1916). The Probate Committee has recommended that RCW 11.40.080 be
amended by the substitution of the words "a decedent," for the words "an estate ;" a
change which will abrogate the existing requirement that claims against the estate be
filed as are claims against the deceased. It is suggested that if the existing provisions
are retained, there is much merit to the argument that the customary "notice to
persons having claims against the deceased" is violative of procedural due process
where used to bar claims "against the estate."
1INo provision is made for extending this period.
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proposes the extension of this section to "the estate" as opposed to only
"real estate."'12  This amendment is suggested to encourage creditors
to exercise their right to letters of administration" 3 where these have
not been otherwise requested, and to provide a supplementary statute
of limitations applicable to creditors' claims, since death tolls the
otherwise applicable statute of limitations.
In 1963, at the instance of the Washington State Bar Association,
the so-called "probate homestead" was increased from $6,000 to
$10,000."' The Probate Committee suggests the retention of this
increase, and, in addition, proposes the elimination of the restriction
that that amount include the house and household goods. The Com-
mittee further recommends the deletion of the existing prohibition
against claiming awards in lieu of homestead from separate property
of the deceased which is otherwise disposed of by will.'15 The result
of that provision was to penalize the making of a will since, if the
deceased spouse had died intestate, the survivor could have claimed
such property. The changes suggested by the Committee thus serve
to permit an election as to the kind and nature of the property to be
awarded and set aside free of the burdens of administration.
RCW 11.52.022 deals with the "award in addition to homestead"
and considers the amount of property passing outside the will or the
jurisdiction of the court as a condition to such award. Previously,
this award became discretionary if the surviving spouse was entitled
to receive insurance on the life of the deceased in excess of five thou-
sand dollars. The Probate Committee's proposal will increase the
amount to ten thousand dollars. The new section also alters the lan-
guage employed to take into consideration other property, as well as
insurance, such as joint checking accounts, savings bonds, and prop-
erty held in joint tenancy. The increase in this amount increases the
amount of property which may be taken by the survivor extra-
judicially, either as a homestead or as an award in addition to home-
stead.
Needed reform has been supplied by a suggested provision".6 which
will overrule the holdings of the Washington court that, even though
112 RCW 11.04.270, as amended by the Committee, also states that "this section shall
not affect liens upon specific property, existing at the date of the death of the
decedent."
113 By virtue of RCW 11.28.120 creditors are the last category of interested patries
who are allowed letters of administration.
114 RCW 11.52.010 and 11.52.020.
115 RCW 11.52.016.
116 New Section 11.52.050.
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all of the property of the estate is set off under chapter 11.52 (as a
"probate homestead"), the estate must still be closed according to the
procedures specified in chapter 11.76. The recommended section pro-
vides that,
If the net estate is set off under the provisions of RCW 11.52.010 through
11.52.030 to the surviving spouse or for incompetent heirs, the court shall,
at the time of making such award and without any additional notice, close
said estate and discharge the personal representative.1 17
This improved procedure will permit the settlement of the small or
modest estate, where there is no will, with a minimum of time and
expense.
Also of consequence in promoting the prompt disposition of estates
is the recommended elimination of the current requirement1 ' that a
report be entered within thirty days of the expiration of the time for
filing creditor's claims. Instead, the Probate Committee recommends
that an "annual" report be required' 1 With respect to a small estate,
a final report is usually filed as the annual report, and little change is
worked here. However, as to large or complicated estates, the annual
report is designed to serve as a source of information to heirs and
beneficiaries, and as a means of impetus to a speedy conclusion of the
administration.
GuARDANsHIP
Few areas of law have been as neglected as the law of guardianship.
Since it was apparently considered an unimportant appendage to codes
respecting the administration of decedent's estates, "like topsy, the
law of guardianship just grew, and it grew in a very illogical fash-
ion." 2 To rectify the Washington situation, the Probate Committee
has proposed a number of changes. Initially, the Committee has de-
fined with precision the persons who are subject to guardianship.
Minors, the insane, and mentally incompetent persons are now defined
as "incompetents." This terminology was taken from the Model Pro-
117 Although this section authorizes closure without additional notice, notices would
have already been given to the heirs by virtue of RCW 11.52.014 and its reference to
RCW 11.76.040, and to creditors if they so specially requested it under RCW 1128.240.
118 RCW 11.76.010.
119RCW 11.76.010 has been altered to read: "Not less frequently than annually
from the date of qualification, unless a final report has theretofore been rendered, the
personal representative shall make, verify by his oath, and file with the clerk of the
court a report of the affairs of the estate."
120 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 183 (Simes 1946)4
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bate Code, and includes persons under the age of twenty-one years,'
persons who are incapable by reason of insanity, mental illness, im-
becillity, idiocy, senility, habitual drunkeness, excessive use of drugs,
or other mental incapacity of either managing his property or caring
for himself, or both. This definition is not designed to enlarge the
class of persons formerly included within the terms "insane and men-
tally incompetent persons." Rather, it recognizes that the term "in-
sanity" has no definite meaning except in connection with a particular
purpose for which the mental state is to be determined, and provides a
choice for those whose sensitivities would prevent them from declaring
that a relative was "insane." Like the existing provision,12 this defini-
tion does not provide guardianship for physically incompetent per-
sons."2 Although this possibility was considered by the Committee, it
was rejected with the realization that no matter how great the physical
incapacity, such a person may still manage his property and care for
himself by a servant or agent if his mind is unimpaired. This being
true, a guardian is not required. Of course, where physical disabilities
impair one's mental capacity, the prerequisites of incompetency may
be met.
One area of guardianship law, fraught with particular difficulty,
concerns those persons who require help in managing their affairs, but
who are not legally incompetent, i.e., the so-called competent incom-
petents. Although no recommendation is made in the current Probate
Committee proposal, this matter deserves extensive study. Most at-
torneys have probably experienced the problems involved in assisting
those persons who are in the twilight zone between competency and
incompetency. Such a person may be one who has both lengthy lucid
and unconscious periods, or who is oriented as to time and place and is
aware of the nature, size and location of his property, but who is, by
reason of age or health, careless or forgetful in depositing funds,
paying bills, or otherwise administering his affairs. Other than guard-
ianship, none of the available solutions is very effective.' In Washing-
121 A minor is now defined in RCW 11.92.010.
122 In In re Nelson, 12 Wn.2d 382, 121 P.2d 968 (1942) the court emphasized that
one should not be declared mentally incompetent merely because he suffers from
some physical malady.
123 At least one court has held a statute providing for the guardianship of a person
whose incompetency was purely physical to be unconstitutional in that it amounted to
a deprivation of the right of enjoying and defending life and liberty and of acquiring
and possessing property. Shafer v. Haller, 108 Ohio St 322, 140 N.E. 517 (1923).
124 Massachusetts partially solves this problem by allowing a conservator to be
appointed for a person who "by reason of advanced age or mental weakness is unable
to properly care for his property." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 201, § 16 (1955).
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ton, the device most often employed is the "power of attorney." Yet,
this is clearly vulnerable since the agent's authority to act depends on
the principal's ability to validly delegate such authority in the first
instance, and to keep it in force. Likewise, use of an inter vivos trust
also requires competency at the time of the trust's execution and at
the time of delivery of the trust assets. This also has the disadvantage
of possibly permantly divesting the trustor of control of his property
when all that was necessary was temporary management.
Although the creation of joint tenancies in bank accounts may pro-
vide a solution with respect to paying medical bills and the like, again
there is the problem of competency at the time of the tenancies crea-
tion. There is also the danger that the disabled person's property may
ultimately pass to those who would not otherwise have been the object
of his bounty.
Finally, while guardianship is an effective solution where the person
to be helped is incompetent, guardianship is both cumbersome and
expensive, particularly when the ward dies shortly after the creation
of the guardianship.
As an alternative to these devices, it has been suggested- 5 that a
statute be enacted under which a document having the formalities of a
will could be executed, which would authorize a named doctor or
attorney to certify that one was incompetent in the sense of being
unable, either temporarily or permanently, of taking care of his busi-
ness affairs. The document would recite that upon such certification,
a designated person would have full authority to manage the competent
incompetent's business affairs. The document could also contain in-
structions similar to instructions to an executor included in a will.
Under such a proposal, some delay and expense would be involved
since a court proceeding would be required. It is difficult to conceive
of a method for establishing the fact that the instrument has become
operative without some form of adjudication. For example, a bank
could hardly be expected to transfer an account balance from the name
of the ward to that of the person designated in the instrument merely
on the strength of a physician's letter describing the ward's condition.
Yet, even though adjudication be needed, this proposal offers two
substantial advantages over our existing guardianship procedure.
First, this would enable the ward to select his guardian or conservator;
1 25 Wynn, A Vacuum in Our Law--Management of Property of Quasi-Incompetent
Persons, in A.B.A., 1956 PROCEEDINGS, PRoBATE AN TRuST LAw Divsiors 27, 31-32.
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second, it would enable the ward to chart the course of action to be
followed, i.e., the ward could direct that certain assets be sold, others
held, that a business be operated, and that funds be employed in a
certain manner for particular purposes. For these reasons, it is sug-
gested that the Bar give considerable attention to such a proposal. As
previously noted, the Probate Committee did not consider this matter,
but has made extensive suggestions with respect to the more essential,
basic guardianship problems.
While the purpose of administration of a decedent's estate is to
collect assets, pay debts and taxes, and distribute the estate, guard-
ianship may involve continuous administration. Indeed, the principal
considerations in an incompetent's estate are the protection and care
of the incompetent and his estate, and the preservation of the
rights of third parties. To facilitate this objective, the Probate Com-
mittee recommends the elimination of the existing "non-claim" provi-
sion,"' and has proposed a section to the effect that a creditor of an
incompetent simply continues to deal with the personal representative
(guardian) as he would with the incompetent.'27 In addition, another
new provision12 authorizes a creditor to file a written claim with the
court for determination at any time before it is barred by the statute
of limitations. Upon proper proof, such creditor may procure a court
order for the allowance of his claim and for its payment from the
estate. The Probate Committee has also recommended an express
addition to the code 29 whereby the guardian may apply to the court
for an order authorizing the settlement or compromise of claims by or
against the incompetent.
The guardianship section of RCW title 11 has otherwise been
altered to conform with the procedure with which attorneys are
already familiar in the case of Veterans Administration Guardianships.
The guardian's duties have been specifically enumerated,' and in-
clude: (1) the filing of a verified inventory within three months from
the date of his appointment, including a statement of all encumbrances,
liens and other secured charges on any items; (2) the filing of a ver-
ified account of his administration annually within thirty days after
126 RCW 11.92.030.
.
2 7 New Section 11.92.035.
128 New Section 11.92.035 (2) provides that "Any person having a claim against
the estate of an incompetent, or against the guardian of his estate as such, may file a
written claim with the court for determination at any time before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, and, upon proof thereof, procure an order for its allowance and
payment from the estate. Any action against the guardian of the estate as such shall
be deemed a claim duly filed." 129 RCW 11.92.060.
13O RCW 11.92.040, as revised by the Committee.
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the anniversary date of his appointment and also within thirty days
after the termination of his appointment; (3) if a guardian of the
person, the care and maintenance of the incompetent, plus his training
and education where a minor; (4) if a guardian of the estate, the
protection and preservation thereof; (5) with some qualification, the
investment and reinvestment of the incompetent's property in accord-
ance with the rules applicable to investment of trust estates by trustees
as provided in RCW 30.24. Where all or any portion of the incom-
petent's estate consists of cash and/or securities, and where these have
been placed in the possession of savings and loan associations or banks,
trust companies, escrow corporations, or other corporations approved
by the court, the court may dispense with the giving of a bond' or
may reduce the same by the amount of such deposits of cash or
securities."3 2
One of the most significant and interesting changes proposed is the
creation of an efficient means of handling the estate of a deceased
incompetent by the guardian without the necessity of terminating the
guardianship and commencing independent probate proceedings. The
new section suggested 3 ' attempts to simplify the procedure involved
when an incompetent dies intestate, and is designed to lessen expenses,
by providing that the guardian has the power under his letters of
administration, and subject to the court's direction, to administer the
deceased incompetent's estate without further letters. This is subject
to a petition brought within forty days from the date of the incom-
petent's death, either by the surviving spouse"34 or those entitled to
letters of administration under RCW 11.28.120.8 Of course, the
exercise of this authority rests in the guardian's discretion, and if he
elects to conduct the administration he must petition the court for an
order transferring the guardianship proceedings to probate proceed-
ings. Upon the court's approval, a new file is to be opened, captioned
131 RCW 11.88.100 provides for the oath and bond of a guardian, and New Section
11.88.107 provides that "In all cases where a bank or trust company, authorized to
act as guardian, is appointed as guardian, or acts as guardian under an appointment
as such heretofore made, no bond shall be required."
132 New Section 11.88.105.
133 New Section 11.88.150.
134 RCW 11.28.040.
185 By virtue of this section, the persons entitled to letters of administration are:
(1) The surviving husband or wife, or such person as he or she may request to have
appointed. (2) The next of kin in the following order: (a) child or children; (b)
father or mother; (c) brothers or sisters; (d) grandchildren; (e) nephews or nieces.(3) One or more of the principal creditors. In lieu of these, under certain conditions,
the court may appoint any suitable person to administer the estate.
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in the deceased incompetent's name, and containing a copy of the
order of transfer. The guardian may then continue the administration
of the estate without the necessity for any further petition or hearing.
Provision is also made for notice to creditors, 3 ' and a four month non-
claim period".. is imposed." 8
The foregoing procedure is effectuated only where the incompetent
dies intestate, where those entitled to letters of administration do not
request them, and where the guardian elects to conduct the administra-
tion. The Probate Committee has recommended a new section".9 which
sets forth comprehensive provision for the termination of a guard-
ianship with, or without, a court order; and a new section 4 ° which
relates to the settlement of the estate upon termination of the guard-
ianship other than by the death of the incompetent intestate. Within
ninety days of the termination of the guardianship other than by death
intestate, the guardian is to petition the court for an order settling his
account, and the court is to set a date for hearing such petition (after
due notice.)' If the court is then satisfied that the guardian's trust
has been properly discharged, an order will be entered approving the
account.'
In addition to the alterations previously noted, the Committee has
recommended that the guardian be given the authority to exchange,
or grant an easement, license or similar interest in any of the incom-
petent's property, in addition to the power of sale, lease or mortgage, 4'
136 New Section 11.88.150 provides, in part, that "Notice to creditors and other
persons interested in the estate shall be published and may be combined with the
notice of the guardian's final account. This notice shall be published in a legal news-
paper of the county of administration once each week for three successive weeks, with
proof by affidavit of the publication of such notice to be filed with the court."
137 This conforms to the proposed alteration of RCW 11.40.010.
13"New Section 11.88.150 also provides that "Liability on the guardian's bond
shall continue until exonerated on settlement of his account, and may apply to the
complete administration of the estate of the deceased incompetent with the consent of
the surety. If letters of adminisration or letters testamentary are granted upon petition
filed within forty days after the death of the incompetent, the personal representative
shall supersede the guardian in the administration of the estate and the estate shall be
administered as a decedent's estate as provided in this title...."
139 New Section 11.88.140.
140 New Section 11.92.053.
141 Notice for such hearing is governed by RCW 11.88.040, as altered by the Com-
mittee, and may be given by registered or certified mail requesting a return receipt
signed by the addressee only, or by personal service in the manner provided for
service of summons. The hearing must be held within ten days after service.
142The order approving the final account is, by New Section 11.92.053, to be
binding upon the incompetent, subject only to the right of appeal as upon a final
order; provided that within one year after the incompetent attains his majority, any
such account may be challenged by the incompetent on the ground of fraud.
The enactment of this section will, in part, qualify existing RCW 4.16.070.
14' RCW 11.92.090.
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has provided for broker's fees and closing expenses in any such
transaction,"' and has authorized the guardian to perform any written
contracts which the incompetent was bound to perform."'
CONCLUSION
It has been said that in this life there are but three things which
every man must do-be born, pay taxes, and die. It is the law and
practice of probate which provides a structural framework for the
consideration of the legal consequences of each event. Because pro-
bate touches every individual, this is the face of the Bar turned
constantly to the public. Thus it is fitting that the monumental and
expensive task of probate review and revision be undertaken by the
State Bar Association. What has been presented is a comprehensive
Probate Code eliminating that which is archaic, unrealistic, outmoded,
or unnecessarily expensive, and which reflects current business prac-
tice and the realities of estate administration. True, no single legisla-
tive presentation can encompass and dispose of every consideration;
undoubtedly there is much to be done. But to the extent that this
proposal is deficient, a modern, considered base is presented onto
which additional reform may be comfortably grafted. Where con-
troversial provisions do appear, as in the intestate succession area,
these may be avoided by drafting. Where the Committee has selected
one policy, the individual may effectuate an alternative if he so chooses.
The proposed code represents a sizeable investment of money and
talent in an attempt to update this vital area of law. Although the
view of these authors may reflect their involvement with the Probate
Committee, it is suggested that the bill be adopted. This recommenda-
tion is made in light of the fact that the code's effective date is 1966,
and that being so monumental an undertaking, only its adoption will
engender the inspection and consideration which is warranted. If the
seasoning period comes pending its effective date, the impetus for
careful dissection is supplied. If, on the other hand, it rests for a
biennium, the mere passage of time will give an air of study which
mnr not in fact have occurred.
144 New Section 11.92.125.
145 RCW 11.92.130, as altered by the Committee.
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